Dooyeweerd's Modal Theory: Hermeneutics in Action

By Dan Rudisill

This post is part of an ongoing symposium interacting with Lambert Zuidervaart's book Religion, Truth, and Social Transformation: Essays in Reformational Philosophy. For more responses to the book, see our table of contents.

Lambert Zuidervaart’s essay “Dooyeweerd’s Modal Theory: Questions in the Ontology of Science” is an examination of Dooyeweerd’s modal ontology with an emphasis on the role hermeneutics played in Dooyeweerd’s method of determining just what a mode is and how these modes fit into a modal hierarchy. This examination primarily aims at the second volume of Dooyeweerd’s New Critique of Theoretical Thought where his theory of modes becomes fully enfleshed.

The reason for the part of the title that reads “Questions in the Ontology of Science” demonstrates the importance of a modal ontology for the differentiation and non-reduction of the sciences, both within the humanities and in the so-called “hard” sciences. Zuidervaart discusses this in detail in both the introduction and post-script to the essay.

Zuidervaart takes as his guiding question, “What are the criteria that must be met during any analysis of the modes of a coherent, referential, and law-bound creation?” (83) There are four facets to this question which guide the bulk of the essay:

• What are the criteria for describing the irreducible nuclei of the modes?
  
• What are the criteria for distinguishing a mode not previously distinguished?
  
• What are the criteria for eliminating an incorrectly distinguished mode?
  
• What are the criteria for proposing a certain irreversible order of modes?
  

Zuidervaart identifies three criteria Dooyeweerd uses to identify modes:

I. The Theoretical Criterion

Zuidervaart writes that,

The theoretical criterion of any irreducible mode is the theoretically isolated general meaning of that mode. It is a concept capturing the unique functional coherence that the individual functions of things, events, acts, processes, or social relationships display within that mode. (86)

For Dooyeweerd, the theoretical criterion of a particular mode is determined by examining its function in light of its place in the temporal order of modes. Everything comes back to time (here one might consult Neal De Roo's contribution to this symposium on Dooyeweerd and time). In fact, Zuidervaart quotes Dooyeweerd as stating, “The idea of cosmic time constitutes the basis of the philosophical theory.” (84) Temporal order is the great brute fact of Dooyeweerd’s theory, and from this notion of temporal order comes the suggestion that, “in each of its modal aspects, [cosmic time] expresses itself as a specific modality of meaning with respect to temporal order as well as duration.” (84)

However, these modal aspects exist in coherence with one another – we do not experience modes as isolated unless we intentionally observe them via theoretical thought. It is in discussing modal coherence that Zuidervaart may tell us why he takes his investigation to be one of hermeneutics (rather than of philosophical methodology as such): “...intermodal coherence finds its expression within each mode by means of the intra-modal coherence of the analogies as they give expression to the nucleus of this mode.” (84)

Analogy plays an important role in Dooyeweerd’s philosophy. Very briefly, all modes refer to other modes via analogy either anticipatively (up the modal scale) or retrocipatively (down the modal scale.) This analogical referring is one way that intermodal coherence is expressed. Recognizing and articulating these analogies is primarily a task of interpretation – this seems to be why Zuidervaart takes himself to be asking questions about Dooyeweerd’s hermeneutics rather than his philosophical method specifically.

II. The Principle of Excluded Antinomy

Zuidervaart states,

One can include more than one way of functional coherence within one concept only at the expense of ignoring the cosmic temporal order and contradicting oneself. Theoretical antinomies result from all such self-contradictory attempts to include more than one way of functional coherence within one concept.....accordance with the principle of excluded antinomy is the primary cosmological criterion of transcendental theoretical truth. (86)

Thus, the principle of excluded antinomy allows the philosopher to preserve a univocity of meaning for each mode. Furthermore, following this principle allows for real diversity within the world and, according to Dooyeweerd, ought to point the philosopher back towards a notion of temporal order that, “guarantees the sovereignty of the modes in their intermodal coherence.” (86-7)

III. The Hypothesis of the Irreversible Order of Succession

Simply put, this hypothesis states that, “the idea of the coherent referential intermodal order of cosmic time requires that this order be an irreversible succession of prior and posterior.” (87) Zuidervaart argues that Dooyeweerd never defends this hypothesis in the New Critique but simply states it as a given.

Zuidervaart then goes on to give two modal “case studies” which demonstrates how these three hermeneutical criteria function for Dooyeweerd; the special mode and the juridical mode. I do not have the space to discuss these case studies here; the reader is encouraged to look at them when this essay is made available, as they do an outstanding job of proving that these three criteria do indeed serve as the guiding lights for the discerning of modes.

Zuidervaart’s Conclusions

The last part of Zuidervaart’s essay is an extended argument against the sufficiency of these three criteria for the formation of a robust ontological modal theory. In brief, Zuidervaart argues that, for Dooyeweerd, any investigation of a mode must begin with an understanding of the nucleus of that mode – the meaning at the heart of the mode that determines both its place in the modal order and the way in which it will analogically cohere with the other modes.

However, Dooyeweerd’s case for discerning the nuclei of the modes rests on an intuitionism that Zuidervaart finds problematic. For Dooyeweerd, intuition is the bridge in which the analytical function of thought is, “embedded in cosmic time” and is the matrix in which the full human self is living out its intermodally coherent existence. (98)

Furthermore, “Once the nucleus, retrocipations, and anticipations of a mode 'have been encompassed in the process of a correct theoretical synthesis of meaning, there is no longer any sense in asking a closer analysis of the nucleus of the [mode] analysed in this process' ([New Critique] 2:485).” (99) Thus, intuition is the beginning and the end of grasping modal nuclei – there can be no theoretical criterion for this activity because it is in itself pre-theoretical.

This is particularly concerning because it reveals that there can be no theoretical guarantee that our intuitions are correct. Moreover, Zuidervaart is concerned that, “naked appeals to intuition will not contribute to debate...In fact, such appeals serve only to cut off debate and to encourage a kind of scepticism.” (101)

Despite this concern, Zuidervaart does glean a list of criteria that Dooyeweerd appears to use when determining modal nuclei. (100-101, my paraphrasing)

• Respecting non-theoretical givens. The description of modal nuclei should show that this explanation accounts for ordinary phenomena (cf the New Critique vol. 2, 579-580)

• Principle of Adequacy – One must show that one’s way of uncovering modal nuclei really does its job – it isolates a certain kind of functional coherence.

• Principle of univocality – One should find a conceptually clear description of the identity of a modal nucleus

• Principle of scientific continuity – One ought to show how one’s understanding of a modal nucleus fits in with contemporary and historical scientific investigations of the subject

• Principle of economy of thought – One’s descriptions of modal nuclei should account for modes in the most linguistically thrifty way.

• Principle of sufficient evidence – One should give enough evidence to convince others of one’s description of a modal nucleus.

These principles can serve to norm intuitive insight into modal nuclei without rejecting the importance of intuition as such. This is an excellent way of preserving Dooyeweerd’s recognition that the human self first experiences the world through intuition while providing a way forward for Reformational modal ontology that is firmly rooted in Reformational ways of thinking.

Ontology and Epistemology in Zuidervaart’s Critique

Zuidervaart’s epistemological criticism of Dooyeweerd’s ontology brings up an interesting question: Does ontology really precede epistemology? If so, then one must argue that Dooyeweerd’s epistemological intuitionism identified by Zuidervaart must lie upon an ontological bedrock yet unearthed by the critique given in the essay. One might follow Jakob Klapwijk, who argues in the twelfth chapter of his book Purpose in the Living World? Creation and Emergent Evolution that Dooyeweerd’s concept of speciation (rooted in his concept of modality) is guilty of a kind of essentialism. His essay “Nothing in Evolution Makes Sense Except in Light of Creation” gives an excellent synopsis of the argument.[1]

Klapwijk argues that Dooyeweerd was committed to an ontological theory of “type” laws which determine the structure (essence) of an individual thing. Because these typical laws are not malleable, he believed in the persistence of “types” in nature (much like Lamarck) and, based on this philosophical position, did not believe that plant or animal evolution from one “type” to another was possible. If one were to study Dooyeweerd’s notion of “types” in volume 3 of the New Critique of Theoretical Thought, one would find that the entire volume is devoted to this notion of types and type-laws. He argued that species represent the most basic “type” of different plants and animals, eschewing questions regarding variations within species in a way that was very similar to his refusal to discuss precisely how insight into modal nuclei is gained other than by intuition.

If Klapwijk is correct in suggesting that Dooyeweerd was indeed an essentialist (a hotly contested claim), then it is possible that this essentialism provided an ontological bedrock for his epistemological intuitionism. It seems unlikely that intuitionism could provide an epistemological warrant for an essentialist position given the diversity of species of plant and animals in the world – recognizing what counts as a variation within a species rather than what counts as a different species altogether is no mean feat even with the highly sophisticated epistemic apparatus that is taxonomy. Rather, an essentialist position is a necessary to interpret current scientific data into an intuitionist framework.

From Klapwijk’s explanation of “types” as an essentialist move, one can see how Dooyeweerd’s concept of modal nuclei as “kernels” of meaning that define the mode and provide insight into how the mode relates analogically to the other modes (see the case studies mentioned above) represents another manifestation of essentialism. Yet, it would appear that essentialism, inasmuch as it is present within a modal ontology might not have the problematic consequences of an essentialism present within a theory of biological speciation as found in the third volume of the New Critique.

In his modal ontology, Dooyeweerd’s essentialist notion of the meaning-nucleus of the modes serves as a guide to the analogical anticipations and retrocipations which allow one to recognize the cohesion of the modes. Thus, the essentialist notion of the modal nuclei serves as a guide to the ways in which the modes interrelate rather than closing down possibility in the way that his essentialism regarding types does in preventing any possibility of evolution between types or perhaps even newly developed relationships between types.[2]

Therefore, the essentialism which Dooyeweerd exhibits in both his modal ontology and in his theory of types may be construed as a hermeneutical move that it not necessarily entailed by his commitment to a modal ontology. While the essentialist commitment of Dooyeweerd stems from the ontological question, “how can one articulate rightly the way the world is ordered” it is a hermeneutical decision on his part to apply essentialism to biological science. There are many Reformational philosophers of science and biologists such as Jacob Klapwijk, Jitse van der Meer, Uko Zylstra, and Jan Lever who accepted Dooyeweerd’s modal ontology (with its essentialist view of modal nuclei) while refusing his typical essentialism.

An Epistemological Retort

Of course, if epistemology does indeed have primacy over ontology, then we can leave Zuidervaart’s critique of Dooyeweerd’s intuitionism as it stands as a sufficient criticism of Dooyeweerd’s modal theory. But, as Zuidervaart himself points out at the beginning of the essay, while Dooyeweerd’s modal ontology is indeed a vital part of his philosophy, it is a foundation; not the entire edifice. Thus, it is always important to study Dooyeweerd’s modal ontology in light of his other commitments as in the case above of types and type-laws as such examinations can shed light on the construction of the upper levels of the structure and show that perhaps if we remove one tower, the entire building will not topple around our ears. In fact, such removal might mike way for some needed renovations of the structure which will allow it to continue to endure into the future.

A Word on Method

Zuidervaart’s essay represents an excellent example of the kind of immanent criticism that Dooyeweerd himself utilized. By a close reading of the text, Zuidervaart has immersed himself in the thought-world of Dooyeweerd and thus not only gives us a clear articulation of the theory and its attending problems but also provides a possible way forward out of the problems identified which is in many ways Dooyeweerdian. This represents the kind of creativity and clear argumentation which should be familiar to anyone who has read Zuidervaart’s work.

Yet, more than being merely Dooyeweerdian in style, this essay represents an example of the way in which immanent criticism in the Reformational tradition allows one to figure out how a philosopher argues and then from there uncover the trajectory of the philosophical argument throughout a text. This is much like being able to identify a river (and therefore to know whither it runs) by recognizing the way in which it flows. In fact, this allows us to bring out an argument implicit in Zuidervaart’s essay; philosophical methodology is always already a hermeneutic.

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[1] Jacob Klapwijk, “Nothing in Evolutionary Theory Makes Sense Except in Light of Creation” Philosophia Reformata 77 (2012) 62-65

[2] An excellent discussion of this particular nexus of problems within the context of inter-human relations can be found in Hendrik Hart, “Creation Order in Our Philosophical Tradition: Critique and Refinement” in An Ethos of Compassion and the Integrity of Creation (Lanham, University Press of America, 1995) especially the section, “Philosophy and the Ethos of Order” beginning on page 69.

Rev. Dan Rudisill is a PhD Junior Member at ICS where he studies the philosophical and theological linkage between Reformational Ontology and Creation Order. He is the Dean of Word & Spirit Revival Training Centre in Mississauga, Ontario.​